INTRODUCTION
The attitude survey has become a standard technique in social research, no more likely to excite comment, considered by itself, than an old and comfortable sweater on a fall afternoon. The initial glamour of large-scale survey research has long since faded, its promise of a genuinely scientific social science long since forgotten.1
Over the last thirty years the public opinion survey as a technique for social research has been institutionalized on a large scale. The General Social Survey (GSS) has been established in sociology, and the National Election Studies (NES) in political science, to produce standard data sets for their respective disciplines. Both have made possible fundamental contributions to survey-based social research, and each has promoted innovation, both methodological and conceptual, at the margin. Yet the chief obligation of the GSS and the NES is to extend a time series, requiring repetition of the same questions in the same way. Perhaps inevitably, given their primary missions, both have tended to promote the routinization of the public opinion survey as a method of social research.
In the last decade, however, the development, first of vignette analysis, and then of computer-assisted interviewing, has helped spur a revolution in the design of the public opinion survey. Although this revolution has been carried out on a number of fronts (for example, the use of computers to facilitate the so-called front-end of interview management), the principal breakthrough has been to combine the distinctive external validity advantages of the representative public opinion survey with the decisive internal validity strengths of the fully randomized, multifaceted experiment.
As with any revolution, when the terrain is closely examined, signs of earlier skirmishes can be spotted. Thus, experimentation has been deployed in attitude surveys for at least a generation. As we mean to make plain, however, the use of experimentation in public opinion surveys more recently has been transformed on two dimensions. The first has to do with form, the second with function. Computer-driven experimental designs are now capable of incorporating multiple factors, each capable of assuming multiple values. In turn, the availability of multifactorial, multivalent designs has encouraged a reorientation from narrowly methodological concerns to broader substantive issues.
Our focus is the integration of experimental design and large-scale, representative, general population samples.2 We begin with the classic form of experimentation in attitude surveys, the split-ballot, then identify two developments especially, the vignette method and computer-assisted interviewing, that have transformed experimental design in general population surveys. To illustrate the variety of designs now on line, we distinguish between nondirective and directive experimental variations, and, among the directive, between postdecisional and predecisional. In addition, to bring order to the wide variety of specific manipulations now undertaken in attitude surveys, we introduce a tripartite analytical schema, sorting experimental variations as a function of whether they manipulate (i) the formulation of a choice, (ii) the context of a choice, or (iii) the characteristics of the chooser. Finally, we give an account of the experimental style now characteristic of general population attitude surveys, underlining its low emotional intensity and low cognitive demands, attributing both to features of (i) the interview site, (ii) the sample, (iii) the mode of interviewing, and (iv) considerations of ethics.
FORM AND FUNCTION: CONSTRAINTS OF THE SPLIT-BALLOT DESIGN
In architecture, function is supposed to define form. In public opinion research, form has defined function. The "split-ballot" experiment in particular has defined, and restricted, the nature and scope of experimental design in survey research for nearly a half century.3
Until the introduction of computer-assisted interviewing, whatever the mode of interviewing (whether face-to-face, over the telephone, or self-administered), public opinion questionnaires had to be printed in advance of being administered. Since separate printing of the whole questionnaire was necessary for each variation of the experimental variable, purely as a practical matter there tended to be only two forms of a questionnaire-the so-called split-ballot design.4 The split-ballot was thus doubly circumscribed: An experiment could manipulate only a single factor, and the manipulated factor could assume only one of two values. Then, too, if multiple experiments were carried out in the same interview, one form of the questionnaire would contain one (of the two possible) versions of each experimental item. The consequence, little remarked, is that although the assignment of respondents to each condition of each experiment 3Two scholars, Howard Schuman and George Bishop, together with their colleagues, have made contributions notable both for scale and quality on a wide variety of subjects; see note 5.
4Examples of split-ballot designs occur that involve three values of the factor to be manipulated experimentally, but they are atypical and in any event involve variation of only one facet. In the overwhelming number of instances, the split ballot involves a single variation of a single factor. See also our discussion of Stoker 1995 in our section on predecisional directive designs, below.
is approximately random, their assignment to treatment conditions across experiments is perfectly correlated.
The requirement of having a fixed form, printed-in-advance questionnaire thus had the primary effect of favoring experimental designs of extreme simplicity. Moreover, by ruling out designs of an interesting degree of complexity, fixed and simple forms had the secondary effect of undercutting interest in the use of experimentation to assess substantive hypotheses. Instead, attention was concentrated on methodological problems. No logical necessity was at work here. But the occasional exception here and there notwithstanding, the predominant use of the split ballot design in survey research has been to identify method-driven variance.
On a wide array of topics, experimental studies of the consequences of variations in question ordering, wording, and context have contributed to enhanced reliability and, perhaps less conspicuously, to increased validity of measurement. Among the subjects on which important contributions have been made are the impact of question order; the differential strengths of open versus closed questions; the assessment of "don't knows" (or "no opinion") and particularly the role of "don't know" filters; the difference between the logic of "forbidding" and of "allowing;" the measurement of "middle" positions; the seminal problem of "nonattitudes"; and interviewer effects.5 Survey research is an applied discipline as well as a scientific undertaking, and the split-ballot design has contributed to the acquisition of practical knowledge of the first order of importance in the design and interpretation of opinion measurement.6
Notable exceptions notwithstanding, the split-ballot research paradigm has four distinguishing features: (i) a single variation of a single facet is experimentally randomized; (ii) the stimulus for the experiment is an empirical anomaly or puzzle; (iii) the focus is on methodological problems rather than substantive theory; and (iv) the explanatory effort, insightful as it can be, is very much post hoc. By contrast, what marks the new wave of experimentation in survey research is the movement (i) from fixed to variable form, and (ii) from a predominantly methodological to a predominantly substantive focus. 6As a footnote to a proper sociology of knowledge, it is worth observing that survey research is one of the few research domains where analysts can be distinguished from practitioners, the latter having specialized competence in the techniques of study design and the conduct of interviews. 
REMOVING CONSTRAINTS: THE VIGNETTE METHOD
Primary credit for bursting the seams of the split-ballot design should go to the development of the vignette method by Rossi and his colleagues.7 To highlight both the distinctiveness of their factorial object approach and strategic issues of analysis it raises, we want to detail a specific application of the vignette method.
Consider a study by Thurman et al (1988) of popular conceptions of illness.8 Their aim was to identify which aspects of individuals' behavior and selfpresentation elicited judgments of mental illness. Accordingly, they generated an enormous number of descriptions of individuals, or vignettes. Each vignette described a (hypothetical but presented as real) person denominated by name, age, religion, education, marital and familial status. In addition, the vignettes factorially vary (i) a series of attributions, each potentially symptomatic of mental illness; (ii) the intensity or frequency of the attributed "symptom"; and (iii) the "bizarreness" and the visibility of deviant behavior. All respondents received a sample of 50 vignettes, randomly drawn from the universe of vignettes. For every vignette, respondents were asked to make the same judgment-namely, to rate the person's degree of mental illness. The vignette method thus centers on randomization and repeated applications.
As against the split-ballot, the vignette design offers an explosion of analytical possibilities. In the mental illness study, for example, instead of being confined to a single variation of a single factor, the impact of a dozen potential indicators of mental illness, taken individually and together, could be assessed-more than 7000 variations in all, opening up for exploration the multifaceted social construction of psychological illness. But vignettes also open up complex issues of design and analysis, three of which deserve particular mention. First, the vignette, not the respondent, is the unit of analysis. On this construction, the N in the mental illness experiment is the number of vignettes, over 7000, not the number of respondents, just over 140. Fairly clearly, the presumption that respondents are essentially substitutable for one another is not always justified, but given that the unit of analysis is the vignette, exactly when and how its validity can be rigorously demonstrated is by no means obvious.
The second problem exacerbates the first. It is perfectly true that each vignette is randomly composed. But the vignettes are also sequentially administered. 8Strictly their study falls outside our purview since it employed a convenience sample of university undergraduates rather than a general population sample. We detail it anyway, because the specific application-to popular conceptions of mental illness-so vividly illustrates the richness of the vignette approach.
Considering the absolute number of serially repeated requests for an identical form of judgment based on a common vignette skeleton-in the mental illness experiment, 50 in a row-the risk of carryover effects from one vignette to another is surely high.9 Large-scale serial repetitions threaten randomized factorial designs.
Finally, the opportunity costs of the vignette method are not trivial. Applied to any given domain, whether popular conceptions of mental illness or ofjustice (Miller et al 1986) or of criminal victimization (Warr 1990 ), a very large number of vignettes must be administered, consuming a relatively large amount of interview time. There is, it follows, a marked practical limit on the number of vignette experiments that can be executed in the course of any one study, with substantial costs; and even if only one is undertaken, there are nontrivial opportunities foregone to measure other attributes. These limitations notwithstanding, the vignette method helped break through the constraints of the split ballot design.
COMPUTER-ASSISTED INTERVIEWING AND COMPLEX EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS
Through computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI), each experiment can have multiple facets, and each facet can take on multiple values. In a CATI10 regime, the questionnaire becomes a computer program. Instead of requiring that for every experimental variation, an individual version of the questionnaire be physically produced in advance, the test item is "composed" at the moment of application. A specific operator is developed for every facet varied (whether of wording, ordering, or formatting). At the moment of application, the operator selects at random from among the values assignable to each facet. Yet, notwithstanding the complexity of experimental designs attainable, the actual manipulations are effortless for the interviewer and invisible to the respondent.
By way of illustration, consider the "laid-off worker" experiment. The purpose of this experiment, most broadly put, is to assess whether whites judge a claim for government assistance for African Americans the same as a claim for help for whites. But to put it this way obscures a central issue. To know that the race of a beneficiary evokes a distinctive reaction, important as this 9Moreover, it is by no means unreasonable to suspect that the carryover effects are highly susceptible to the kind of person-item interactions that the vignette design, by taking the vignette as the unit of analysis, is not well-positioned to estimate. 10We refer to CATI, since the bulk of practical applications to this point have been telephone interviews, but with the reduction in price for personal computers, the use of CAPI (computerassisted personal interviewing) on a large scale is only a matter of time.
is to establish, is not enough. It is necessary to ask what it is about race as a social category that evokes a distinctive reaction.1" Accordingly, in addition to race, other factors-gender, age, parental-marital status, and work history (whether reliable or unreliable)-are also varied. Since each attribute of the laid-off worker is varied independently of each other, and some are dichotomous but others polytomous, counting all combinations of characteristics, the experiment encompasses 96 variations.
In its profusion of configurations of characteristics, the spirit of Rossi's vignettes is manifest. The individual respondent not the vignette method is the unit of analysis. As a consequence, the main effects of the laid-off workers' attributes can be estimated, as can (a number of) interactions among attributes (e.g. what difference does it make to be African American and an unmarried mother?); so, too, can connections between characteristics of the laid-off worker and characteristics of the respondent (e.g. do liberals and conservatives react differently when assessing how much government help should be given an African American person who has not been a dependable worker?).12
Given that computer-assisted designs can be multifactorial and that the manipulated factors can be multivalent, experiments of substantial complexity can be carried out. No less important, many more than one experiment can be conducted in the course of just one interview, and since the randomization applies across, as well as within, measures, each experimental manipulation is orthogonal to every other. In addition to preventing experimental effects from cascading systematically through the interview, independence across treatment items opens up opportunities for innovation, an example of which is the development of a multitrait, multimethod, multigroup assessment of prejudice.
In the assessment of prejudice toward a group, a fundamental issue is the distinctiveness of hostility to particular groups as against the consistency of hostility across groups. Computer-assisted interviewing makes possible assessment of cross-group consistency experimentally. By way of example, consider a country experiencing two distinct streams of immigration, one black and the other white. immigrants, two sets of measures of prejudice were developed, one centering on the ascription of undesirable personal characteristics (e.g. lazy, violent), the other on the attribution of responsibility for societal problems (e.g. causing crime to increase, jobs to decrease).'3 To see what difference being black makes (as opposed to being an immigrant whether black or white), both sets of measures were administered to every respondent, varying the race of the immigrant group. One half of the respondents were asked whether African immigrants tend to have undesirable personal characteristics, the other half whether Eastern European immigrants do; and the same, for the attribution of responsibility for social problems.
So far, the design is equivalent to a split-ballot, except in one critical respect. Unlike a split-ballot, respondents are randomly assigned not only to each set of measures but across the two sets of measures. Respondents are thus experimentally distributed across two conditions: in one, respondents assess the same group (whether Africans or East Europeans) throughout both series of prejudice measures; in the other, they assess one group for the first series, then switch to the other for the second (one half beginning with Africans then turning to East Europeans, the other half doing it just the other way round). Taking advantage of the randomization across measures, one can generate estimates of evaluative consistency for respondents making judgments of the same group for both series of measures and for those making judgments of one group for the first series and of a completely different group for the second. As it turns out, it is impossible to tell if respondents, midway through, have switched and begun evaluating an entirely different group. The multigroup, multimethod design thus offers evidence, of a kind previously unavailable, showing that prejudice entails a systematic tendency to respond to others negatively, not in virtue of their membership in a specific outgroup, but in consequence of their categorization as members of an outgroup. difference our intervention makes. Thus viewed, experimentation in attitude surveys is a method aimed at seeing the effect we produce when we manipulate an aspect of the interview, either by selectively exerting pressure on respondents, or by selectively distributing information, in an effort to induce respondents to give one rather than another response.
NONDIRECTIVE DESIGNS
There is much to recommend this view of experimentation as centering on active intervention, but it privileges a narrow conception of the uses of experiments in attitude surveys. To expose a broader view, nondirective experimental designs need to be distinguished from directive. Directive designs correspond to the established conception of experimentation as active and deliberate intervention. By contrast, nondirective designs involve the randomized assignment of respondents to question form without an intent to sway, influence, or control the direction of their response.
Nondirective designs are easily the less familiar; so for illustrative purposes, we focus on the "list" experiment.14 Common experience suggests that white Americans, to avoid the appearance of racism, will avoid expressing negative sentiments they hold about matters of race and may even express positive sentiments they do not hold. The list experiment procedure has been devised to get around this constraint. Although the designs of list experiments can be complex, the logic is straightforward. Suppose the task is to assess anger over affirmative action. Respondents are randomly assigned to a baseline or treatment condition. To each respondent in the baseline condition, the interviewer says: "I'm going to read you a list of some things that make some people angry. Tell me how many make you angry or upset. Don't tell me which ones. Just tell me how many." In the baseline condition, the list has four items, none racial in content (e.g. companies polluting the environment). In the other condition, everything is exactly the same, with respondents again instructed "Tell me how many make you angry or upset. Don't tell me which ones. Just tell me how many," except that there are now five items on the list; the fifth refers to affirmative action. Now, suppose that a particular respondent in the test condition is angry over pollution and upset over affirmative action. Asked how many items make her angry, she replies two, knowing with certainty that the interviewer cannot possibly figure out that one of the two refers to affirmative action. But although the interviewer can't tell,15 the analyst, by contrasting the means of the baseline and treatment conditions, can (i) calculate the proportion of people 14The list experiment was conceived by James Kuklinski of the University of Illinois for the specific purpose of providing an unobtrusive measure of racial anger. See, for example, Kuklinski et al 1996.
15Unless, of course, the respondent says she is angry at all the items in the baseline condition, a possibility deliberately made remote by the writing of the items. angry over affirmative action, and (ii) identify attributes of the individual that increase (or decrease) the likelihood of anger over affirmative action.
The list experiment is an illustration of a larger class of experimental variations that are nondirective, whether or not they are unobtrusive.16 The experimental variations are not intended to influence, control, or manipulate the direction of responses. If, to take the example of affirmative action, whites reveal themselves to be angry over preferential treatment, that is a fact about their makeup that they have revealed, not an act that they have been persuaded or coerced into committing.
DIRECTIVE: POSTDECISIONAL AND PREDECISIONAL
Interventions characteristically occur before respondents answer the question put to them in public opinion surveys, precisely because their purpose is to influence the answers given. Not the least interesting development, however, has been the development of post-as against predecisional manipulations. The logic of a postdecisional intervention is easiest to see in a political context. Just because more people start off on one side of an issue does not mean that, if push comes to shove, they will stay there. Politics is about argument and counterargument: One side of an issue may start off with more supporters, but the other may enjoy more committed adherents. The result: the initial minority, after the rough and tumble of public argument, can wind up the winning majority.
One way of exploring the dynamics of political argument, then, is to begin with people after they have chosen a position on a public issue and present to each side a counterargument, to see whether one side can be talked out of its position more easily than the other. In the case of government programs to assist African Americans, for example, proponents and opponents are presented with counterarguments, each tailored to talk them out of the position they have just taken. As it happens, it appears easier to talk proponents of government assistance for African Americans out of their position than opponents out of theirs; indeed, so much so that when the effects on both sides are counted up, the initial majority in favor of government help for African Americans can turn into a clear majority in favor of African Americans having to rely on themselves (see Sniderman & Piazza 1993).
As outlined, the counterargument technique is only quasi-experimental. The counterargument that respondents encounter depends on the side of an issue they select, and those selecting one side of an issue, plainly enough, may differ systematically in any number of respects from those choosing the other. Then, too, given the logic of political argument, the strongest argument against 16For a definition and discussion of unobtrusive measurement, see Eugene Webb et al 1981.
government assistance for African Americans is unlikely to be the same as the strongest argument for it. An indeterminacy is thus built-in. Those on one side may change more than those on the other because, by virtue of being less committed, they are more susceptible to change. Alternatively, they may be more likely to change because the counterargument they heard was stronger. But how can these two possibilities be distinguished? To get leverage on this problem, so-called content-free17 counterarguments have been developed. Taking advantage of computer-assisted interviewing, either a substantively relevant or content-free counterargument, is delivered. The proportion of respondents willing to give up a position on a public issue without having been presented with a substantively relevant reason for doing so can then be estimated. Moreover, since the content-free counterargument, by virtue of being content-free, applies symmetrically to both sides of an issue, the relative proportions on either side of an issue willing to abandon their view in the face of a counterargument can also be calculated, thus establishing whether those on one side of the issue are distinctively more susceptible to counterpressure.'8 Postdecisional designs are a comparative rarity, however. Far and away the central focus is predecisional, the aim being to change a response about to be made rather than one already made. Given both the recency and volume of predecisional interventions in general population attitude surveys, it would be quite wrong to suggest that experimental work of this order is being undertaken under the direction of a single overarching theoretical perspective-or even of a small number of them. Not least because of the recency of substantively oriented experimentation in attitude surveys, research very much gives the impression of analysts starting off from a thousand different points and heading off in another thousand directions. To convey something of the variety and promise of this new wave of research, we shall impose an organizing schema of our own, classifying studies as a function of whether the experimental focus is on (i) the formulation of the choice, (ii) the context of the choice, or (iii) the characteristics of the chooser.
Formulation of the Choice
Arguably the most instructive, certainly the most prominent, research focus involving experimentation in attitude surveys, is the burgeoning research on "issue 17In a study of Italy, for example, respondents on both sides of the issue of regional autonomy were told: "Considering the complexity and the uncertainty of problems in Italy nowadays, are you still in favor of (or opposed to) autonomy for the regions, or would this make you change your mind?" 18Strictly, selection effects can still be at work, since respondents are self-assigned to opposing sides of an issue; although with identical counterarguments, the interpretation then favors substantive-i.e. the differences are part of the natural state of affairs-not artifactual factors.
framing." Under the heading of framing, two lines of work have developed. Their points of similarity notwithstanding, the two are worth distinguishing.
In the first line of research, framing effects refer to preference reversals evoked by alternatively formulated, but utility equivalent, choices. As Kahneman and his colleagues have shown in a classic series of laboratory-based studies,19 contrary to the notion of rational choice, preferences are subject to reference point effects. (See, for example, Kahneman et al 1993, Kahneman & Knetsch 1992, and Green et al 1994.) Faced with two alternatives, each offering an opportunity to be better off, subjects have a strong propensity to favor the alternative promising the greater gain, even if it has the lower probability of occurring; however, faced with two alternatives, each involving a risk of being worse off, subjects have a strong propensity to favor the alternative entailing the lesser loss, even if it has the higher probability of occurring. This asymmetryrisk-taking in the domain of gains, risk-aversion in the domain of losses-is striking, just because the expected utility in the two cases is by construction the same (for a political example, see Quattrone & Tversky 1988). Or, to cite a second example, surgical treatment of lung cancer is significantly more likely to be elected if surgical outcomes are presented in terms of the probability of living rather than of dying-even though, from a statistical perspective, the information conveyed is exactly the same (Wilson et al 1987) . The notion of framing, so conceived, is strict. Alternative formulations of a choice cash out just the same, from the point of view of expected utility. Indeed, precisely the point is to demonstrate that alternative formulations, even though exactly utility-equivalent, elicit preference reversals. 2(Framing, so construed, is by no means a new object of study. Classic question order and wording effects can also be construed as framing effects, in this second sense. The classic studies, however, have treated framing effects as measurement error, to be minimized, rather than as substantive variance, to be analyzed. action, suggesting in one condition that it discriminates against whites, in the other that it gives an unfair advantage to African Americans. As they show, depending on whether the objections to affirmative action are phrased in terms of "reverse discrimination" or "unfair advantage," expressed preferences about affirmative action are differently related to positions on other racial policies, to deeper values such as equal opportunity, and to prejudice itself. Just so far as framing defines the meaning of a choice, these results suggest, how people choose-as opposed to what they choose-will vary.21
This conception of issue framing has recently been given a major extension. Again focusing on the public's reactions to the issue of affirmative action, Stoker (1995) has drawn a distinction between context-free and context-specific choices. Public opinion surveys, she points out, ask ordinary citizens their view of affirmative action either generalizing "over contexts in which affirmative action policies are implemented or making no reference to context whatsoever" (Stoker 1995, p. 4). In law, by contrast, judges confront the issue of discrimination in specific problem-contexts, each raising specific justifications for action. A finding of prior discrimination has, for example, emerged as a pivotal consideration in court-mandated affirmative action. Pursuing the intuition that context-specific and context-free judgments differ, Stoker designed an experiment distributing respondents across three conditions: a "baseline condition," in which no justificatory context for a judgment about affirmative action is supplied; a "representation" condition, in which the ground advanced for the policy is the need for a company's work force to approximate the general population; and a "discrimination" condition, in which the ground consists in a finding of prior discrimination. As it turns out, support for affirmative action is equivalently low in the first two conditions, but markedly higher in the third.
From a methodological point of view, it is worth underlining the benefit obtained from extending the standard split-ballot design by even one degree of freedom. If the experiment could have assumed only the standard two formssay, in this instance, the baseline condition and the discrimination treatmentthe finding would be systematically ambiguous. The increase observed in support for affirmative action could have been a function not of the particular reason given but merely of some reason, any reason, being given. But since support did not increase in the "representation" condition, even though it, too, presents a reason for supporting affirmative action, then the decisive factor must be the specific argument of prior discrimination, not argumentation per se. Thus, because they can be multivalent as well as multifaceted, computer-driven 2'For a fascinating discussion of framing effects of racial policies in universalistic or groupparticularistic terms, see Bobo & Kluegel 1993. experiments can have an inferential power that the traditional split-ballot design cannot.
Context of the Choice
By the context of the choice we mean features of people's circumstances, apart from the specific terms in which the choice before them has been framed, that may guide the choice they make.
Both methodologically and causally, the notion of context can be given alternative (but not mutually exclusive) interpretations. Construed distally, the notion of context points to factors operating at some remove from the specific occasion of making a choice. In a pioneering research program, Iyengar and his colleagues have ingeniously manipulated one of the most prominent of the distal factors-namely, televised news.
Characteristically, they examine general population subjects (who are volunteers rather than random selections). 23This result is relevant to our discussion, below, of ethics in experimentation with general population respondents. effects of prestige names on support for state Supreme Court justices, show that both the likelihood of offering an opinion on whether or not a justice should be confirmed, and the direction of the opinion offered, is influenced by whether or not respondents are told the name of the governor who had appointed a particular justice. In weighing the alternatives put before them, however, respondents in public opinion surveys characteristically have to compensate for informational shortfalls; how they manage this can itself vary with the amount of information they have on hand.24 Smith & Squire, accordingly, go on to show that the effect of the prestige name manipulation varies inversely with respondents' level of formal education, suggesting that those who are less well-informed tend especially to take advantage of the extra information supplied in the form of source endorsements in order to compensate for their lack of information. Methodologically, then, a major benefit of integrating experimentation with attitudes surveys is the ability to play off the steepness of gradients in both information on hand and skill in its utilization, analyzing the interactions of experimental treatments with individual characteristics, particularly levels of political awareness and sophistication, in the public taken as a whole.25
This type of source influence, in which the general public uses the source of an argument to evaluate its merits, has long seemed a paradigmatic example of irrational reasoning. However, illustrating the payoff in examining interactions of experimental manipulations and respondent attributes, Lupia (1995) examines the impact of media figure endorsements, varying the direction of the position attributed to them, on reactions to a contentious but second-rank issue: spending money to build more prisons. In an elegant analysis, he demonstrates that perceived political agreement with the source and judgments about the source's knowledge of policy-not mere liking of the source, nor even common interests with him-underlie persuasion "when the context within which the speaker and receiver interact itself supplies a basis for trust" (Lupia 1995, p. 13). From a methodological perspective, the point to underline is that Lupia's analysis, like Smith & Squire's, requires that respondent attributes take on the full range of values characteristic of a general population sample.
Characteristics of the Chooser
The last of the elements in our analytic schema-characteristics of the chooser as distinct from those either of the choice or its context-is systematically ambiguous. It most often refers to characteristics of experimental subjects, such 24For arguments on the interaction with political sophistication, see Sniderman et al 1991, ch. 1,2.
25The steepness of awareness and political sophistication gradients in the general public sample has proven to be a theme of fundamental importance in the analysis of political and social belief. For a classic treatment, see Converse 1964; also see Luskin 1987. as their level of formal education,26 which typically tend to be enduring over time but which are in any case exogenous from the viewpoint of the experimental manipulation. But in addition to respondent characteristics that are (relatively) fixed, there are characteristics that are susceptible to manipulation, particularly mood, affective state, and cognitive orientation.27
There is a relative paucity of research on experimentally induced emotional states or cognitive orientations, partly for reasons we take up below in discussing the experimental style characteristic of attitude surveys. But, methodologically, the experimental manipulation of respondents' feelings and evaluative orientations in the course of a public opinion interview represents the opening of a new avenue of inquiry. To suggest the promise of this new avenue, we point to a pair of illustrations.
A premise whose truth frequently has been taken for granted is that citizens' judgments are more likely to be supportive of democratic rights if they are made in more deliberative and less emotional fashion. Kuklinski and his colleagues (1991, 1993) have excavated this taken-for-granted premise, and in the process strikingly demonstrated the power of a well-designed experiment to break new ground.28 In their experiment on support for freedom of speech, respondents are assigned either to a deliberative instruction set, in which they are specifically asked to make up their mind after reflecting on the potential consequences of allowing a particular group to express its point of view, or to an emotion-arousing instruction set, in which they are specifically invited to make up their mind on the basis of their gut feelings. From the point of view of previous research, the conventional prediction is that the more thought respondents give the principle of free speech, the more likely they are to support it in the experimental test since they overwhelmingly support it in the abstract. Just because this prediction seems so obvious, the results of Kuklinski and his colleagues are the more striking. Respondents in the deliberative condition prove to be less, not more, politically tolerant than those in the emotion-arousing condition.
Similarly ingenious, Zaller (1992) has introduced the "stop-and-think" experiment. In the experiment, the intervention takes the form of presenting a question to a respondent on an issue, then, before he or she has a chance to 
EXPERIMENTAL STYLE IN ATTITUDE SURVEYS
By undertaking a gallery tour of recent studies, our aim has been to convey concretely the range, variety, and innovativeness of recent experimental design in attitude surveys. Having emphasized the diversity of current undertakings, we want to call attention to the commonalities in their experimental style.
Experimentation in attitude surveys tends to be characterized by: (i) interventions of deliberately low intensity, (ii) most often taking the form of manipulation of information rather than arousal of emotion, (iii) with the focus of experimentation falling primarily on variations in the framing of the choice presented to respondents and secondarily on variation in the immediate context of the choice as opposed to manipulation, whether by arousal or deception, of the chooser. These commonalities in experimental style, we shall suggest, reflect cumulative constraints in design manifest in survey-based experimentationconstraints, we argue, imposed by the interviewing (i) site; (ii) sample; (iii) mode and (iv) ethics.
Site
General population attitude surveys, whether conducted over the telephone, face-to-face, or self-administered, characteristically take place in the respondent's home, with both direct and indirect consequences for experimental design.
Directly, conducting an attitude survey in the respondent's home excludes manipulations requiring laboratory facilities, or indeed, assessments of variables utilizing specific spatial layouts.29 The extension of computer-assisted personal interviewing, and in particular the exploitation of the computer screen for the manipulation of visual displays, may modestly relax the first constraint; it is less likely to relieve the second.
Indirectly, the typical site for attitude surveys raises compliance issues, just so far as the willingness of respondents to engage in experiments is reduced by virtue of the interview being conducted in their own home. It is one thing to induce adults to participate in an experimental protocol in an unfamiliar, perhaps even intimidating setting; quite another to do so in their own living room or kitchen. The problem of compliance, it should be observed, has two aspects. Globally, there is the problem of interview breakoffs. Emotionally arousing or cognitively demanding manipulations tend to be ruled out for fear respondents will terminate the interview, the more so if they are in their own home and being interviewed over the telephone. Additionally, there is the problem of experimental exit, with respondents free to leave the field selectively, by refusing to complete an experiment, by selecting a "don't know, can't say" response, or making up a preference on the spot-the classic "non-attitudes" problem. Both complete break-off and selective exit, it should be obvious, raise potentially serious risks of self-selection effects. population sample can be quite outside the reach of the remaining fifth. Just so far as censorship of data, either through interview break-off or experimental exit, is tied to a dimension of respondent variation like education, the threat to validity is all too easily lethal. The result is an experimental style favoring both low emotional intensity and low cognitive demand manipulations.
Sample
Moreover, experimental subjects can be re-enrolled, not without difficulty to be sure, but feasibly all the same. By contrast, apart from the rare, and exceptionally funded, panel study, general population surveys are one-shot affairs. The conception of change they can examine is accordingly doubly foreshortened. On the one side, and most conspicuously, the examination of persistence of change tends to be out of bounds: whether changes evoked by experimental manipulations last a moment beyond the interview is not only unknown but unknowable. On the other side, and more subtly, the change evoked by an experimental intervention has to occur almost immediately. Respondents have to get the point of a manipulation virtually straightaway; hence a preference for immediately intelligible manipulations. A condition of making a variety of laboratory experimental manipulations work is presenting some respondents with information that is not strictly true, or alternatively misdirecting their attention. But either way they have been misled. A necessary, although not necessarily a sufficient, justification of deception surely is that everything is put right afterwards. Debriefing provides assurance that respondents are not treated merely as means to an end; that they leave the experimental setting as they entered it; even that entirely unanticipated misunderstandings are corrected. But it is difficult, purely as a practical matter, to guarantee debriefings in general population attitude surveys. Because of considerations of cost, it is usually not practical to contact respondents subsequent to an interview. Moreover, partly because of cost, partly because of the (usually low but never zero) risk of break-off, it is difficult to guarantee they can be debriefed at the end of it. The effect is that deception in general population attitude surveys is difficult to justify under current human subjects regulations.
Taking account of constraints imposed by interview site, sample, mode, and ethics, the net result is an experimental style in attitude surveys characterized by a trio of features: (i) interventions of deliberately low intensity, (ii) most taking the form of the manipulation of information rather than the arousal of emotion, (iii) with the focus of experimentation falling primarily on variations in the framing of the choice presented to respondents and secondarily on variation in the immediate context of the choice as opposed to manipulation, whether by arousal or deception, of the characteristics of the chooser.
REPRISE
After a season where the principal emphasis in survey-based experimentation was on standardization of measurement, with both the advantages and disadvantages this confers, the emphasis is now on substantive discoveries rather than methodological refinements, and on innovation-new technology, new procedures, new objectives. In order to bring some of these newer techniques more distinctly into view, we have distinguished between directive and nondirective designs, pre-and post-decisional interventions, and variations in the formulation of choice, the context of choice, and the characteristics of chooser. If this analytical scaffolding does its job of stimulating still newer techniques, it will properly be abandoned.
